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Abstract
We study how small open economies can escape from deflation and unemployment in a
situation where the world economy is permanently depressed. Building on the framework
of Eggertsson et al. (2016), we show that the transition to full employment and at-target
inflation requires real and nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. However, because
of adverse income and valuation effects from real depreciation, the escape has a beggar
thy self effect, that may end up lowering welfare while eliminating underemployment. We
show that as long as the economy remains financially open, domestic asset supply policies
or reducing the effective lower bound on policy rates may be ineffective or even counter-
productive. However, closing domestic capital markets does not necessarily enhance the
monetary authorities’ ability to rescue the economy from stagnation.
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1 Introduction
Real interest rates fell to historic lows around the industrialised world in the two decades
prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and fell even further thereafter. Unemployment
rose during the crisis, and remains high in several major economies. Leading observers have
raised concerns that this may reflect “secular stagnation” (Summers (2013), echoing Hansen
(1938))—a durable, possibly permanent fall in the natural interest rate to levels too low to
be attained with existing (low) inflation targets, hence giving rise to chronic unemployment
(Eggertsson et al. (2017)). In the leading interpretation, secular stagnation is the result of an
“asset shortage”: because of financial distortions in the form of credit constraint on economic
agents with the high marginal propensity to spend, the desired savings of the economy at full
employment cannot be absorbed by the stores of value available in the domestic economy at
positive interest rates.1
In this paper, we study the implications of global secular stagnation for macroeconomic dy-
namics and the trade-offs faced by policymakers in a small open economy that is integrated
in the world goods and financial markets. Open economies can in principle alleviate asset
shortage by acquiring foreign assets and depreciating their currencies. Eggertsson et al. (2016)
(henceforth EMSS) and Caballero et al. (2016) (henceforth CFG) study a global equilibrium
in which the negative spillovers from such developments can actually spread secular stagna-
tion worldwide. Complementing these analyses, we study the domestic equilibrium and issues
in economic stabilization from the vantage point of a country that simultaneously faces weak
external demand due to the global slump and, as long as it remains financially open, an ineffi-
ciently high real interest rate, pinned down by the equilibrium conditions in the international
capital markets. To carry out our analysis, we build an overlapping-generations framework
that combines the features stressed by EMSS and CFG. In particular, we specify an economy
that has some monopoly power over its terms of trade, but is otherwise small enough not to
affect the policy behavior and the macroeconomic equilibrium in the rest of the world.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we show that under plausible conditions a small
open economy in a world of chronic deflation and deficient demand can be in either of two
disjoint steady-state equilibria—an underemployment steady state symmetric to the rest of
the world, and a full-employment equilibrium with inflation at target, trend nominal depre-
ciation, a permanently weaker real exchange and the accumulation of net foreign assets. In
the full-employment equilibrium, trend nominal depreciation is required to insulate domestic
1To the extent that the domestic monetary policy framework is unable to accommodate the fall in the real
interest rate required to bring supply and demand for assets back into line when the economy operates at full
employment, the margin of adjustment becomes a reduction in output.
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inflation from the deflationary drift abroad (associated to the global secular stagnation). A
depreciated real exchange rate is required to maintain a high foreign demand for domestic
output and support full employment. Accumulation of net foreign assets is required to absorb
higher national savings, to the extent that these are generated by income and balance sheet
effects from escaping secular stagnation.
Second, we study welfare gains from escaping global secular stagnation as the result of two op-
posing forces. On the one hand, when pursuing domestic full employment, domestic incomes
and lifetime utilities rise with increasing output at given terms of trade. On the other hand,
for a given output path, real depreciation reduces purchasing power internationally and may
exacerbate the financial constraints in the economy—in our baseline, these constraints limit
the ability of the young generation to borrow and consume in anticipation of future income,
whose value falls with real depreciation.2 We find that the adverse income effects of real
depreciation may be strong enough to reduce welfare overall. This is the case if trade elas-
ticities are sufficiently low, as this increases the rate of real depreciation required to support
full employment. Moreover, as further discussed below, beggar-thy-self effects also arise when
countries attempt to escape stagnation relying on policies that address domestic distortions—
and this independently of trade elasticities. Currency wars can therefore be beggar thy self,
rather than beggar thy neighbor.3
Third, we characterize the macroeconomic dynamics along the transition from the underem-
ployment to the full employment equilibrium. Since bringing the economy to full employment
entails an increase in domestic inflation relative to the rest of the world, it follows that the
nominal exchange rate must steadily depreciate—an echo of Svensson’s “Foolproof Method”
(Svensson (2001))—and therefore that escape is not possible without exchange rate flexibility.
However, capital mobility means that the real interest rate is pinned down in international
bond markets, and hence is the same (and too high) in both the stagnation and the full em-
ployment equilibrium. This is in contrast to theoretical and policy accounts of business-cycle
stabilisation, stressing the need for policy makers to set the real interest rate at its “natural”
level to achieve full employment.4
2In the case in which lifetime utilities rise when moving from secular stagnation to full employment, in
each generation losses when young are more than compensated by gains when middle-aged or old. To provide
further insight on the role of balance sheet effects of depreciation in driving net foreign asset accumulation, in
an extension of the model, we explore the implication of a different specification of the borrowing constraint
on the young.
3For an analysis of beggar-thy-self depreciation in open economy macroeconomics, see Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001).
4The transition path to full employment is different from the escape from liquidity traps in the standard
New-Keynesian models. As expectations shift to the full employment equilibrium, the real exchange rate tends
immediately to fall towards its new equilibrium level. This switches demand to the home economy and leads
to net capital outflows. As output starts to recover, both nominal and real interest rates immediately rise in
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Three additional sets of results concern policy implications, with focus on capital controls,
measures that address domestic financial distortions and hence raise asset supply, and mone-
tary stabilization. Starting with the capital controls, it is well understood that by preventing
cross-border asset trade, domestic policy makers regain control over domestic real interest
rates, as these are no longer determined in international financial markets via international
asset arbitrage. In global stagnation, however, control over the real rate may not helpful per
se, because the natural rate under financial autarky may still be negative and unachievable
by conventional monetary policy because of the zero lower bound on nominal rates. The
question is whether, under such circumstances, the country is nonetheless able to achieve full
employment by boosting its competitiveness and external demand via depreciation. We show
that the answer is negative. Unless the financial autarky natural rate is sufficiently high,
closing the economy financially and hence barring the possibility to accumulate foreign assets
actually eliminates the full-employment steady state: there is no equilibrium in which the
increase in external demand following real depreciation is sufficient to rebalance the secular
stagnation distortions. This result provides an instructive caveat on the desirability of capital
controls as a way to avoid secular underemployment. In a global secular stagnation, capital
controls are effective only if complemented by policies that raise domestic asset supply, with
sufficiently positive effects on the domestic natural rate.
Although measures that increase the supply of domestic assets are desirable under financial
autarky, we show that domestic policymakers have no incentive to pursue them under financial
integration. This is so not only because these measures are neutral in terms of domestic
output and inflation—again, this follows from the fact that real rates are not sensitive to
domestic savings imbalances, but determined internationally. More importantly, to the extent
that they raise the saving-absorption capacity of the economy, they lead to capital inflows,
and thus to lower external surpluses and a weaker real exchange rate. By the logic of the
“transfer problem” in international economics (after Keynes (1929)), aggregate consumption
falls, detrimental to national welfare. Hence under financial integration, measures to address
domestic financial distortions turn out to be beggar thy self.
Similar considerations apply to policies attempting to counter low inflation and/or lackluster
growth by relaxing the effective lower bound (ELB) on nominal interest rates.5 We show
that, in financially integrated small open economies, a lower ELB is generally not benefi-
anticipation of further nominal and real depreciation.
5The Danmarks Nationalbank (DN), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Sveriges Riksbank
and the Swiss National Bank (SNB) all cut interest rates to below zero during the period from
mid-2014 to early 2015. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) and Bank of England applied similar poli-
cies. See Bech and Malkhozov (2016)) and BoEMonetary Policy Summary, 4 August 2016,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/Documents /mpc/mps/2016/mpsaug.pdf
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cial to welfare. The intuition resonates with the neo-Fisherian argument recently made by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2017) and Cochrane (2017), among others. Namely, with real
rates determined internationally, lower nominal rates must eventually entail trend exchange
rate appreciation, lower inflation, and thereby a more negative output gap. Hence again, a
measure aimed to adress domestic distortions turns out to be beggar thy self under financial
integration. Yet, we also emphasize that, should the ELB become binding along the escape
path, relaxing it can help to ease the transition to full employment.6
Two points of contact with the literature are worth highlighting here. In line with the recent
literature reviving secular stagnation, we focus on the case where the world is permanently in a
liquidity trap with negative natural rates. Yet, our analysis naturally relates to contributions
that study open economies in a temporary liquidity trap, either using a two-country model
(Cook and Devereux (2013) and Acharya and Bengui (2017)), or taking the perspective of
a small open economy (Corsetti et al. (2017)). Exchange rate adjustment is key in all these
studies and the present one to moderate the negative effects of a global liquidity trap for the
domestic economy. In particular, the nominal exchange rate needs to depreciate persistently
to allow domestic inflation to rise above the world deflationary drift. But in contrast to our
analysis, in these frameworks the domestic real rate must fall to boost demand.7
As we focus on a small open economy, we do not discuss the cross-border spillovers that may
stem from different domestic adjustment paths—amply discussed by Eggertsson et al. (2016)
and Caballero et al. (2016) in their two-country frameworks. By no means do we intend to
downplay these issues. In particular, if a sufficient number of small open economies pursue
the escape path depreciating their currencies, their joint behavior is likely to have a first-order
effect on the world real interest rate and allocation. In this case, domestic policymakers might
need to focus on domestic stimulus rather than relying solely on the exchange rate channel,
while support from other policies, including structural policies and asset-supply policies, might
be necessary to lift global natural rates. It is precisely because, as we have shown here, each
small country has an incentive to pursue an individual escape path from stagnation—but not
to raise the supply of its assets by addressing domestic financial distortions—that international
policy coordination may be highly beneficial.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the two-country model
used in our analysis. Section 3 establishes that a full-employment steady state exists under
6In an extension of our model we show that, along the escape path, the exchange rate overshoots its long
run level on impact if trade volumes are initially slow to respond. In this case, the nominal rate remains stuck
at zero for a number of periods, such that relaxing the ELB would ease the transition to full employment.
7Since we do not model capital, we abstract from the issues in portfolio allocation in a liquidity trap,
whereby agents may prefer holding monetary assets over equities, creating an endogenous negative feedback
effect on real activities, see Den Haan et al. (2017) and Bacchetta et al. (2016).
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financial integration, but also that this steady state may be welfare inferior (beggar thy self)
to the stagnation steady state. It also studies how the economy escapes from the secular
stagnation. Sections 4 and 5 turn to policies and discuss, respectively, financial autarky and
asset supply policies, and alternative monetary policies. Section 6 concludes. The appendix
includes proofs as well as model extensions and robustness analysis.
2 A model of a small open economy in a global depression
We consider a model of a small open economy (SOE) under perfect foresight, integrated with
the rest of the world (ROW) in goods and asset markets. The framework is one of overlapping
generations (OLG), as in Eggertsson et al. (2016) and Eggertsson et al. (2017). The SOE and
the ROW each specialize in the production of one good, but consume all goods. With home
bias in demand, this leads to fluctuations in the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.
Furthermore, international asset markets are incomplete. In both economies, households live
for three periods: young, middle-aged, and old. All the income accrues to the middle aged,
such that the young borrow to be able to consume subject to a borrowing constraint, whereas
the old consume their savings from last period. Labor supply is exogenous, and wages are
assumed to be downwardly sticky.
2.1 Households
Denoting 0 < β < 1 the time-preference rate and 1/ρ > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, domestic households maximize
max
{Cyt ,Cmt+1,Cot+2}
{
(Cyt )
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
(Cmt+1)
1−ρ
1− ρ + β
2 (C
o
t+2)
1−ρ
1− ρ
}
subject to the sequence of constraints
PtC
y
t = −Byt
Pt+1C
m
t+1 = PH,t+1Yt+1 + (1 + it)B
y
t −Bmt+1
Pt+2C
o
t+2 = (1 + it+1)B
m
t+1
−(1 + it)Byt ≤ DtPH,t+1.
Here, Pt is the consumer price index (CPI—the price of domestic consumption), PH,t is the
producer price index (PPI—the price of domestic output), it is the nominal interest rate, and
Dt is the borrowing constraint faced by the young. Furthermore, C
i
t , i ∈ {y,m, o}, represent
consumption by the young, middle-aged, and old, respectively, and Bit, i ∈ {y,m} are bond
holdings/savings by the young and middle-aged, respectively. We assume that bond holdings
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consist of three assets Bit = B
n,i
t +PtB
r,i
t +EtBx,it , where Et is the nominal exchange rate (the
price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). Hence households face a domestic-
currency bond, a CPI-indexed (real) bond and a foreign-currency bond.
Without loss of generality, we will focus on equilibria where only the domestic-currency bond
is traded (Bit = B
n,i
t ),
8 and where the young borrow all the way up their borrowing constraint.
This implies
Cyt = −Byt
1
Pt
=
Dt
1 + it
PH,t+1
Pt
=
Dt
1 + rt
PH,t+1
Pt+1
, (1)
where (1 + rt) ≡ (1 + it)Pt/Pt+1 is the domestic consumption-based real interest rate (see
below). Note that a rise in the CPI relative to the price of domestic income exacerbates the
borrowing constraint on the young. This is because we define the borrowing limit in units of
output—i.e., the nominal value of the constraint is deflated by PPI (equivalent to the GDP
deflator in our specification) rather than with the CPI. We motivate this by noting that the
collateral the young can possibly pledge when borrowing is the output they will produce when
middle aged. In the Appendix A.5, nonetheless, we discuss a variant of the model where the
borrowing limit is defined in consumption units.
Because the middle-aged may trade three different assets, they must satisfy three Euler equa-
tions. The Euler equation for the CPI-indexed bond is
(Cmt )
−ρ = β(1 + rt)(Cot+1)
−ρ.
The Euler equation for the domestic nominal bond, once combined with the Euler equation
for the CPI-indexed bond, implies the Fisher equation
(1 + rt) = (1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
. (2)
By the same token, the Euler equation for the foreign-currency bond implies the uncovered
interest parity (UIP) condition
(1 + it) = (1 + i
∗
t )
Et+1
Et . (3)
The UIP condition reflects a pricing equilibrium condition in international asset markets,
because foreign-currency bonds are traded internationally at interest rate (1 + i∗t ).
In contrast, the old consume all their savings from last period, Cot = (1 + rt−1)(Bmt−1/Pt−1).
By combining the previous equations, we obtain the equilibrium bond holdings of the middle-
aged generation (stated in real terms)
Bmt
Pt
=
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt − PH,t
Pt
Dt−1
]
, (4)
8As we assume one period debt and perfect foresight, the denomination of debt is not relevant for the
equilibrium allocation. For example, valuation effects of the exchange rate on foreign-currency-denominated
debt are anticipated and priced in the cost of debt.
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which coincide with the gross savings of the economy.
2.2 Goods market integration
We assume the domestic consumption basket is made up of domestically-produced and ROW-
produced goods as follows
Cit =
[
(1− ω)(CiH,t)
σ−1
σ + ω(CiF,t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, i ∈ {y,m, o},
where CH,t is demand for the domestically-produced, CF,t is demand for the ROW-produced
good, where 0 < 1−ω ≤ 1 is the degree of home-bias in consumption and σ > 0 the intratem-
poral (trade) elasticity of substitution.9 Expenditure minimization leads to a relationship
between the CPI and the PPI as follows
Pt = [(1− ω)(PH,t)1−σ + ω(PF,t)1−σ]
1
1−σ , (5)
where PF,t is the price of the ROW-produced good (expressed in terms of domestic currency).
We assume the law of one price holds at the level of each good
PH,t = EtP ∗H,t PF,t = EtP ∗F,t,
where an asterisk indicates variables in the ROW (here: the price of the domestic and the
ROW-produced good, expressed in terms of foreign currency). Then, the domestic terms of
trade (the price of imports in terms of exports) are given by
St =
PF,t
PH,t
, (6)
whereas the real exchange rate (the price of ROW-consumption in terms of domestic con-
sumption) obtains from
Qt =
EtP ∗t
Pt
. (7)
2.3 Firms and labor market
Output is produced using labor from residents of the respective country, according to
Yt = L
α
t ,
where 0 < α ≤ 1. Optimality requires Wt = PH,tαLα−1t . As in Eggertsson et al. (2017), we
assume that nominal wages are downwardly sticky of degree 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
Wt = max{W˜t,W flext },
9Under ω = 1, domestic households would consume exclusively foreign goods, such that the real exchange
rate would be one at all times. A value for ω < 1 is sufficient to insure equilibrium real depreciation, as long
as the trade elasticity σ is smaller than plus infinity.
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where W flext ≡ PH,tα(Lf )α−1 (here, Lf > 0 denotes full employment), and W˜t is a wage norm
which solves
W˜t = γWt−1 + (1− γ)W flext .
2.4 Phillips curve and monetary policy
Following Eggertsson et al. (2017), we use the production function together with the wage
norm to derive a Phillips curve of the form
Yt =
γ Y α−1αt−1
ΠH,t
+ (1− γ)(Y f )α−1α
 αα−1 (8)
whenever ΠH,t (:= PH,t/PH,t−1) < (Y f/Yt−1)
1−α
α , and
Yt = Y
f (9)
else, where Y f = (Lf )α is output under full employment. Notice that the Phillips curve is a
function of current, not expected, inflation.
We posit that the monetary authorities target PPI inflation subject to a zero-bound constraint
on nominal rates:
ΠH,t = Π¯ subject to it ≥ 0. (10)
If inflation falls below target, nominal rates fall to zero:
it = 0 if ΠH,t < Π¯. (11)
So, once the economy is in stagnation and nominal rates are at the zero lower bound, they
are inelastic to current as well as target inflation: a change in the inflation target per se does
not affect agents’ expectations about the current and future monetary stance.
2.5 Market clearing
Because the domestic economy is small, the CPI in the ROW will correspond to the price of
foreign output, P ∗t = P ∗F,t, from which follows
Qt =
P ∗t Et
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
= St
PH,t
Pt
. (12)
Domestic goods market clearing is then given by
Yt = (1− ω)
(
Pt
PH,t
)σ
Ct + ωS
σ
t Y
∗
t , (13)
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where Ct := C
y
t + C
m
t + C
o
t denotes aggregate domestic consumption. Furthermore, asset
market clearing (stated in real terms) requires
NFAt
Pt
= − Dt
1 + rt
PH,t+1
Pt+1
+
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt − PH,t
Pt
Dt−1
]
, (14)
where NFAt is the domestic country’s net foreign asset position. In each period, this is the
difference between the savings of the middle-aged generation and the borrowing by the young
(compare equations (1) and (4)). From the households’ budget constraint, the flow budget of
the domestic country is
Ct +
NFAt
Pt
= (1 + rt−1)
NFAt−1
Pt−1
+
PH,t
Pt
Yt. (15)
2.6 The domestic natural real rate
In a financially integrated small open economy, as we will see further below, the real interest
rate is determined in the international bond markets, irrespective of whether there are nominal
rigidities at national level. Hence, under full financial integration, there is no distinct measure
of the country-specific natural real interest rate, customarily defined as the real rate which
prevails when prices and wages are perfectly flexible. However, for future reference, it is
convenient to define a natural rate for a small open economy operating under financial autarky.
To do so, assume the economy is closed to trade in financial assets such that the net foreign
asset position equals zero at all times. We may then deduce the real rate that clears the asset
market from equation (15)(
[(1− ω) + ωS1−σt ]
[(1− ω) + ωS1−σt+1 ]
) 1
1−σ
Dt
1 + rnatt
=
(
1
1 + [β(1 + rnatt )
1−ρ]−
1
ρ
)[
Y f −Dt−1
]
, (16)
where we have used that, absent nominal rigidities, the economy operates at potential at all
times (Yt = Y
f ). Note that the term multiplying the borrowing by the young is a function of
the expected change in the terms of trade and therefore drops out in steady state. As a result,
in steady state, the domestic natural rate is a decreasing function in domestic full-employment
output as well as in the tightness of the domestic financial constraint.10
2.7 Rest of the world: secular stagnation at global level
In modeling the rest of the world, we assume symmetry in economic structure with the small
open economy, except for size and policy parameters, including those potentially affecting the
tightness of the borrowing constraints on the young.
10This is easiest to see in the case of log-utility, ρ = 1, where 1/(1+ [β(1+rnatt )
1−ρ]−1/ρ) becomes β/(1+β).
In this case (1 + rnat) is easily seen to be decreasing in Y f , but increasing in D. A tighter domestic financial
constraint means a lower D, i.e., D being closer to zero.
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Assumption 1. The small open economy and the rest of the world have the same degree
of risk aversion, time preference, curvature of the production function, full-employment (per
capita) output and degree of downward stickiness.
Since the domestic economy is small, the rest of the world effectively is a closed economy, so
we can draw on the main results by Eggertsson et al. (2017). Specifically, we posit that D∗,
the borrowing limit imposed on the young, is sufficiently tight that the ROW is in a secular
stagnation steady state. Inflation and output (Π∗, Y ∗) then jointly solve
D∗Π∗ =
(
1
1 + [β(Π∗)−(1−ρ)]−
1
ρ
)
[Y ∗ −D∗]
as well as
Y ∗ = Y f
(
1− γ/Π∗
1− γ
) α
1−α
,
where we have used the fact that i∗ = 0 such that (1 + r∗) = (Π∗)−1— the ROW counterpart
of Fisher equation (2). It is easy to show that, in this steady state, both Π∗ < 1 and Y ∗ < Y f
and therefore that
(1 + r∗) = (Π∗)−1 > 1.
Hence, in secular stagnation, the market rate is positive and therefore strictly higher than
the natural real rate. As in equation (16), the latter is the real rate that would prevail absent
nominal rigidities, implicitly defined in
D∗
1 + (rnat)∗
=
(
1
1 + [β(1 + (rnat)∗)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
)[
Y f −D∗
]
.
The mechanism by which the economy finds itself trapped in stagnation is the same as in the
analysis by Eggertsson et al. (2017). At the core of the problem is a tight budget constraint
D∗ for the young that drives down the natural real rate clearing the market for saving by
the middle-aged to negative territory. A negative natural rate is not necessarily a problem if
the central bank chooses a high enough inflation target. In this case, if markets coordinate
expectations on the (high) inflation target, there is enough room for setting nominal policy
rates sufficiently low, while still in positive territory, for the bond market to clear at the
natural rate. Yet, even with the high enough target, markets could still coordinate expecta-
tions on the low inflation rate associated with stagnation, causing nominal policy rates to be
constrained at their zero lower bound. In this equilibrium, the monetary stance is endoge-
nously contractionary, causing the output gap to remain open on a permanent basis—thereby
validating the adverse private sector expectations.11
11It is worth stressing that, in our model specification, prices are fully flexible. With competitive firms,
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2.8 Equilibrium definition for the small open economy
For initial conditions {Y−1, NFA−1, P ∗−1, P−1} and exogenous {Dt}, and for given variables
in the rest of the world {D∗, r∗, Y ∗,Π∗, P ∗t = Π∗P ∗t−1, i∗ = 0}, an equilibrium in the domestic
economy is a set of sequences {Ct, Yt, Qt, St, PH,t, PF,t, Pt,ΠH,t,Πt, Et, it, rt, NFAt} that solve
equations (2)-(3), equations (5)-(15) and the definitions for PPI and CPI inflation ΠH,t ≡
PH,t/PH,t−1 and Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1.
Throughout the paper, we will posit that the small open economy faces a global secular
stagnation, a situation in which the world economy is permanently trapped in an equilibrium
with deflation, zero nominal interest rates, and inefficient output gaps. From the perspective
of the domestic economy, this means stagnating external demand, and inefficiently high real
rates, via the equilibrium conditions in the international bond markets. We will explore how
a small open economy can cope with this situation, first looking at its steady states, then at
transition dynamics, then at the effects of domestic asset supply and monetary policies.
3 Escaping a global secular stagnation
In our analysis, we explicitly focus on a situation in which the ROW is permanently de-
pressed. We now show that, despite the resulting low demand and inefficiently high real rates
internationally, a small open economy may nonetheless operate at full employment.
In this section, for ease of exposition, we present this result conditional on the domestic
economy and the ROW sharing the same parameters in terms of policy, including the inflation
target Π¯ and, more importantly, the borrowing constraint on the young Dt—in addition to
our assumed symmetry in terms of the underlying technology (Assumption 1). However, we
stress that this assumption is by no means necessary to derive our multiplicity results that
follow: in Sections 4-5 we explore the effects of systematically departing from our assumption
of a symmetric conduct of policy.12
thus, prices are equal to marginal costs—firms are on their labor demand schedule. In contrast, because of
nominal wage rigidities, workers are not necessarily on their (vertical) labor supply. An insufficient demand
in the good market at the equilibrium real interest rate reduces the demand for labor below full employment.
An important theoretical property of the model is that, given the Phillips curve above, wage flexibility per
se would not help addressing underemployment. As long as a response of current wages to low demand does
not affect expected inflation, scaling down labor costs (and thus prices) proportionally today and in the future
cannot have real effects in equilibrium.
12For example, this implies that the domestic economy may find itself in full employment even when its own
distortions are tighter than in the ROW, hence potentially conducive to secular stagnation. At the opposite
extreme, as we emphasize in Section 4, with integrated goods and capital markets, a small open economy may
find itself trapped in stagnation in spite of relatively sound policy fundamentals, i.e., mild financial distortions
and a high inflation target.
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3.1 Two steady states
Under our symmetry assumptions, as the ROW is in secular stagnation, there exists a symmet-
ric steady state in which the small open economy is also in stagnation. But, as the following
proposition states, with integrated world goods and bond markets, such an equilibrium for
the home economy is not unique. There is also a second steady state, characterized by full
employment, inflation on target, and a strictly positive nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1. The small open economy can find itself in one of two steady states, one with
stagnation, the other with full employment. Under our symmetry assumptions, the stagnation
steady state is characterized by purchasing power parity Q = S = 1 and zero net foreign
assets NFA = 0. Conversely, the full employment steady state has Y = Y f , inflation on
target, (1 + i) = Π¯/Π∗ > 1, and is associated with trend nominal depreciation, permanently
depreciated real exchange rates, Q > 1 and S > 1, and a larger (strictly positive) stock of net
foreign assets NFA > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix A.2.13
Proposition 1 states that a small open economy can find itself in a full employment steady
state even if the rest of the world is not. Intuitively, it can “export the problem”, in that
domestic full employment requires a weaker real exchange rate, so to increase demand for the
country’s output. Open capital markets allows the country to export its excess saving, and
build up net foreign assets.
3.2 Full employment requires depreciation and foreign asset accumulation
To dig deeper into the economics of our first proposition, observe that, by the Phillips curve
(8), full employment is not attainable at a negative inflation rate. In the full employment
steady state, domestic inflation must necessarily be higher than in the secular stagnation
equilibrium. From purchasing power parity (7) and the fact that the real exchange rate must
be constant in steady state, this also implies that the small open economy must experience
trend nominal depreciation, at a rate determined by the ratio of the domestic inflation target
and the negative inflationary drift abroad:
Et+1
Et = Π¯/Π
∗ > 1. (17)
It follows that a full employment steady state is feasible only under exchange rate flexibility.
If the domestic monetary authorities pursue a fixed exchange rate target, they must accept
13The existence proof contains the general case of asymmetry in the policy parameters which, as explained
above, is explored in detail in Sections 4-5.
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an inflation rate identical to the international one, which is negative and associated with
stagnation.
However, a higher inflation rate does not imply a lower real interest rate. With integrated
financial markets, the real interest rate in the domestic economy is pinned down by its ROW
counterpart up to (expected) changes in the real exchange rate
(1 + rt) = (1 + r
∗)
Qt+1
Qt
, (18)
where we have combined the domestic Fisher equation (2) and its foreign counterpart, the
UIP condition (3) and purchasing power parity (7). Because in steady state the real exchange
rate must be constant, it follows that (1 + r) = (1 + r∗). As a result, from the perspective of
the small domestic economy, the steady state domestic real rate is exogenous and therefore
the same in both the employment and stagnation steady state.
This has two key implications. First, since the real rate cannot decline in the small domestic
economy, full employment is not achievable without a boost in demand for domestically
produced goods, which under imperfect goods’ substitutability requires real depreciation.
Second, because the real rate is identical in the two steady states, but the rate of inflation
is strictly higher in the full employment than in the stagnation steady state, the domestic
nominal rate must lift off zero, from Fisher equation (2).
The country accumulates net foreign assets as the flip-side of exporting its full employment
domestic production. In steady state we have
[(1− ω) + ωS1−σ] 11−σ NFA
P
= − D
1 + r∗
+
1
1 + [β(1 + r∗)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
Y f −D
]
, (19)
where we have used that (1 + r) = (1 + r∗) and re-written the relative price P/PH by using
equation (5) and the definition of the terms of trade (6). The right hand side of this expression
defines the “excess savings” of the domestic economy under full employment, which are a
function of exogenous fundamentals and policy parameters, but independent of international
relative prices (the terms of trade or, equivalently, the real exchange rate). As the left
hand side shows, these excess savings are absorbed by a positive net foreign asset position.
Note the size of the required net asset adjustment crucially depends on the equilibrium real
depreciation, which in turn is a function of trade elasticities. In general, under a high trade
elasticity, the real exchange rate may move by only little to have significant effects on external
demand: the change in the net asset position will be the main margin of adjustment. For
lower trade elasticities, the real exchange rate movements will be larger: the adjustment in
net foreign asset will correspondingly be smaller.
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3.3 The beggar-thy-self effects of real depreciation
The real exchange rate depreciation associated with full employment produces contrasting
effects on demand and welfare. On the one hand, it makes domestically produced goods
cheaper, redirecting demand towards them. This is what raises the level of domestic produc-
tion to potential. On the other hand, for any given output, it reduces the international value
of domestic production. Everything else equal, this makes domestic residents poorer. With
incomplete markets, the income effects from depreciation are not mitigated by risk diversifi-
cation via financial markets. They can actually become stronger than the substitution effects
(see Corsetti et al. (2008b) and Corsetti et al. (2008a)).
Depending on the extent of real depreciation that is required to bring the economy to potential,
it is possible that the full employment steady state characterized in Proposition 1 is welfare
deteriorating. We state this in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Under our symmetry assumptions, for a trade elasticity that is sufficiently
low—below approximately σ < 1/(2 − ω)—the full employment steady state produces lower
levels of domestic consumption despite higher levels of domestic production. The escape to
full employment in this case is beggar thy self.
Proof. See the Appendix A.4.
The equilibrium rate of real depreciation depends on the degree of substitutability between
domestic and foreign production, as captured by the trade elasticity. Intuitively, as domesti-
cally produced and imported goods become less substitutable, larger swings in relative prices
are required in order to redirect demand from one to the other. Hence with a lower trade
elasticity, the extent of real depreciation in the escape increases. At the same time, real
depreciation, all else equal, reduces the purchasing power of domestic households interna-
tionally. In the case of symmetric policy parameters, Proposition 2 states that below the
threshold of σ < 1/(2− ω), this effect is strong enough for domestic consumption to actually
fall—notwithstanding the rise in domestic production.
The main lesson from our analysis is apparent. While a small open economy can escape global
secular stagnation via real depreciation, strong income effects from the adverse movements
in the terms of trade reduce the net benefit of the escape—in principle, welfare may even fall
when moving to the full employment steady state. Unless there are large utility gains from
preventing involuntary unemployment, of the kind advocated by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016), a “currency war” can then be beggar thy self.
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3.4 Transition dynamics: the path to full employment
We have established the existence of a full-employment steady state for the small domestic
economy. In this subsection, we rely on numerical analysis to study how the domestic econ-
omy escapes stagnation by solving explicitly for the transition path to full employment. We
design our exercise taking advantage of the fact that the equilibrium in the model is globally
indeterminate, in that the dynamics can be affected by “sunspot shocks”. Starting from the
stagnation steady state, we posit that a change in beliefs triggers transition to the full em-
ployment steady state.14 The sunspot shock is modeled as once-and-for-all non-anticipated
shock, after which there is no further uncertainty. Here we consider the escape of a country
that is not at the risk of beggar thy self, as trade elasticities are sufficiently high.
The transition to full employment may be summarized as follows. The country first experi-
ences a large upfront nominal and real depreciation, and more gradual depreciation thereafter,
as well as a temporary rise in both nominal and real interest rates relative to their initially
depressed steady states. As the economy gradually recovers, it runs current account surpluses,
in the process accumulating net foreign assets. In the long run, the country finds itself in the
new steady state characterized by the same real interest rate as under stagnation, however
by a permanently depreciated real exchange rate, trend nominal depreciation, as well as a
strictly larger stock of net foreign assets.
As the economy recovers, consumption of the young actually declines, while the consumption
of the middle-aged and old increases. The latter reflects that, because trade elasticities
are high, the national income valued at international prices increases along the escape. In
contrast, the young are negatively affected by the escape, for two reasons. First, the real
exchange rate depreciation deteriorates their balance sheet: the collateral against which the
young borrow becomes less valuable in terms of their consumption. Second, the real interest
rate rises, such that their borrowing becomes more expensive. Still, for each generation, the
contraction in consumption when young is more than compensated by the gain in consumption
when middle-aged and old: a “jam-tomorrow” result by which there are net gains over their
life-cycle, and overall the escape is welfare improving.15,16
14For a discussion of global indeterminacy, see earlier models of inflation targeting under a zero lower bound
constraint (for example Benhabib et al. (2001)). Benhabib et al. (2002) discuss how global indeterminacy can
be ruled out in a closed economy setting with a zero lower bound. Cochrane (2011) critically reviews papers
trying to resolve global indeterminacy.
15Note that this result also depends on our modeling utility as deriving only from consumption. In contrast,
if the higher labor supply associated with higher production at full employment carries utility losses, this result
may be overturned. In contrast, if there are utility gains from avoiding involuntary unemployment, of the kind
advocated in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016), this result may be further strengthened.
16In one key dimension the escape path discussed is reminiscent of Svensson’s “Foolproof Method” to escape
a liquidity trap in an open economy: what jumps-start the economy is an increase in inflation expectations
associated with a weakening of the nominal and real exchange rate (Svensson (2001) and Svensson (2003)).
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Figure 1: Transition to full employment, w/o beggar thy self. The parameters are taken from
Eggertsson et al. (2017); we are using β = 0.96, α = 0.85, γ = 0.9, ρ = 1, L¯ = 1, D = 0.32, Π¯ =
1. For the parameters that are not in their study, we are using an import share of ω = 0.2,
as well as a trade elasticity of σ = 1.
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In this context, the escape path is different when the economy is affected by beggar thy self.
In the Appendix A.4 we show the equivalent of Figure 1 in such an economy. The negative
welfare implications of the escape are illustrated by the fact that the consumption of all
generations drops along the transition. Interestingly, in this case, the savings by the middle-
aged contract along with the borrowing by the young. Yet, capital outflows are still positive
because the contraction of domestic borrowing outpaces the contraction of domestic saving.
In the Appendix A.4, we also show the escape for an economy in which trade elasticities are
initially low, but rising along the transition to the new steady state.17 An intriguing novel
result is that, with trade elasticities changing over time, the exchange rate overshoots in the
initial phase of the escape. As a result, the lift-off of the nominal interest rate from zero is
not immediate, but it remains stuck at its zero-bound for a number of periods.
3.5 Equilibrium determinacy
A notable result in our analysis is that the the full employment steady state is locally deter-
minate, whereas the stagnation steady state is locally indeterminate. This last result appears
at odds with the claim by EMSS that the stagnation steady state is locally determinate when
both economies are symmetrically constrained by their zero lower bound. We verify that
there is no inconsistency: in the Appendix A.3 we include a discussion of the local stability
properties of the symmetric stagnation steady state.
We now turn to the policy analysis. We thereby move away from our baseline specification
assuming symmetry in policy parameters, and consider a host of measures concerning seg-
menting domestic from global financial markets, removing financial distortions hinging on
the credit constraint on the young, and/or reforming monetary policy by either raising the
inflation target or reducing the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates.
4 Capital flows and asset supply
In this section we analyze two issues related to capital account liberalization and financial
regulation policies. First, we ask whether a country may be better off by closing down its
However, Svensson focuses on the escape from a temporary liquidity trap, assuming a unique steady state.
In this context, because of the presence of nominal rigidities, a boost in demand and temporary depreciation
requires a fall in real interest rates. In Figure 1, instead, depreciation and inflation are associated with a
temporary rise in real rates—a common result in contributions modeling the escape from a liquidity trap
as a transition between two, stagnation and full employment, steady states—see, e.g., Cochrane (2011) or
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2017).
17The motivation for this is the empirical evidence that trade elasticities may vary at different horizons, see
for example Ruhl (2008) and Crucini and Davis (2016). More generally, going out of secular stagnation may
be associated with a redefinition of the country’s patterns of trade, which may be reflected in a changing trade
elasticity.
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border to trade in assets. This is tantamount to ask whether trade openness may help a
country escape secular stagnation without changing its external position. Second, we study
the effects of loosening domestic credit conditions via policies that foster access to financial
resources by constrained agents.
4.1 Restricting capital mobility: financial autarky
Our first question is whether the country may be better off by giving up financial integration.
A potential benefit is that absent trade in cross-border assets, the UIP condition (3) does
not need to hold in equilibrium. As a result, also the UIP condition in real terms (18) is not
an equilibrium condition, such that domestic policy makers re-gain control over the domestic
real rate of interest. Hence the country may expect to raise the demand for its output up to
potential via a combination of lower real rates (below the international level) and a depreciated
real exchange rate—without any need to run current account surpluses. Our model yields a
striking negative result, stated in relation to our baseline symmetric economy.
Proposition 3. Under our symmetry assumptions, consider the case in which the small open
economy is in financial autarky such that it trades goods internationally but capital markets
remain closed and hence NFAt = 0 at all times, implying that the UIP condition (3) does not
need to hold in equilibrium. The secular stagnation steady state is now unique: the multiplicity
of equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 disappears.
Proof. Consider equation (14) and impose that NFAt = 0. In steady state, this equation can
be written as
D
1 + r
=
1
1 + [β(1 + r)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
(Y −D).
Imposing full employment Y = Y f , this equation is solved by r = rnat—see equation (16).
Because of our symmetry assumptions with the ROW, rnat is sufficiently negative by assump-
tion, such that r = rnat is incompatible with the inflation target and the zero lower bound
constraint i ≥ 0.
In financial autarky, escape from secular stagnation via depreciation is a balancing act between
raising foreign demand and containing internal balance sheet effects. On the one hand, higher
foreign demand moves the economy to full employment, which raises domestic savings. On
the other hand, balance sheet effects on the young reduce the domestic borrowing. We have
seen above that, in an economy open to asset trade, the consequence are capital outflows.
In contrast, in a financially closed economy, the consequence is an equilibrium drop in the
domestic real interest rate. Yet, as demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3, for this drop
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in the real interest rate to restore full employment, its size would have to be so large that the
implied nominal interest rate, under the given inflation target, would violate the zero lower
bound constraint. Hence in our baseline specification, the balancing act from real depreciation
resolves against full employment.
This line of arguments suggests that the equilibrium could be sensitive to how responsive the
households’ balance sheet is to real depreciation. To provide insights on this, in the Appendix
A.5 we specify the credit constraint on the young in terms of consumption rather than in terms
of output units. In the so-modified model specification, the borrowing by the young hence
the savings-absorption capacity of the economy does not fall with a weakening currency. As
a result, the real interest rate needs to fall by less (not all the way to the natural rate) to
bring asset demand back in line with asset supply, such that the implied nominal interest rate
may remain positive. Notably, in this case the escape from stagnation becomes more likely
when the income effects from depreciation are strong, since, as the economy recovers from
stagnation, the desired savings by the middle-aged rise by little or may even fall (recall the
discussion in Section 3.4).
Proposition 3 is derived under symmetry of economic conditions in our SOE and the ROW. By
the logic of this proposition, however, it should be clear that closing the economy financially
can be instrumental to maintain full employment if the small open economy operates in the
parameter space outside the secular stagnation, namely, if Dt is high enough that the domestic
natural rate is non-negative (see also the next subsection).
Under this asymmetric model specification, the domestic economy would be fundamentally
sound, yet, because the stagnation steady state still exists (see the proof of Proposition 1 in
the Appendix A.2), at risk of importing global secular stagnation under financial integration.
As long as the domestic natural rate is non-negative, imposing capital controls can therefore
shield the economy from being drawn into stagnation alongside the ROW. Intuitively, by de-
linking domestic from international financial markets, with enough domestic saving-absorption
capacity at full employment, monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy at positive
nominal interest rates.
4.2 Relaxing the domestic financial constraints under financial integration
Our discussion above suggests that, under financial autarky, the domestic policymakers have
a strong incentive to ease the distortions in the domestic credit conditions, as a way to raise
the domestic natural rate. Indeed, in line with closed economy analysis of secular stagnation
(Eggertsson et al. (2017)), under financial autarky policies that boost the amount of lending
to the young not only increase their consumption demand, but also reduce the desired savings
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by the middle-aged.18
This is in sharp contrast with the effects of such policies under financial integration. As we
have argued above, in this case domestic real rates are determined internationally via equation
(18) and are therefore insensitive to domestic savings imbalances. As a consequence, a policy
of financial deepening cannot but be neutral in terms of domestic real rates in steady state.
Then, from the Fisher equation (2), its ROW counterpart, and the fact that both economies
are at the zero lower bound, the rates of deflation in the two economies must be synchronized
in steady state, too. In turn, from the Phillips curve (8), the steady state output gaps in the
two economies must also be perfectly aligned.
From this does not follow, however, that financial deepening is neutral in terms of the equi-
librium allocation. Precisely, a rise in Dt raises domestic real borrowing B
y
t /Pt via equation
(1), reduces domestic real saving Bmt /Pt via equation (4), and hence reduces the net foreign
asset position. Intuitively, as the young borrow more while the middle-aged save less, the
economy experiences capital inflows: domestic households end up holding less foreign assets.
As a consequence, income generated from foreign assets is lower in the new steady state, such
that the real exchange rate depreciates and domestic consumption falls (in the Appendix A.6
we show these results analytically).
These effects are best understood in light of the “transfer problem”, after Keynes (1929).
The main issue concerns the effects on relative prices of transferring purchasing power from
one country to another: in our model, a lower net foreign asset position in steady state can
be interpreted as a domestic transfer to the ROW. It is well known that, with home bias in
consumption, the country that transfers resources experiences a fall in demand for its own
output (as foreigners will demand proportionally more of theirs). Equilibrium then requires
a weaker real exchange rate. Moreover in the present context, because output is unchanged
with the transfer (as argued earlier on), only the income effect from the depreciation remains,
such that the depreciation—even for high trade elasticities—unambiguously reduces domestic
consumption. Therefore, paradoxically, even if neutral with respect to aggregate output, an
increase in the supply of domestic assets ends up being beggar thy self.19 ,20
18The latter follows from the fact that, if the household accumulates greater debts while young, it has fewer
assets to save from when middle-aged.
19By the logic of the transfer problem, increasing Dt has beggar-thy-self effects also conditional on the full
employment equilibrium under financial integration. A subtle and unsettling result from our analysis is thus
that, under financial integration, the looser is the credit limit on the young (the higher is Dt), the lower
consumption is in both the full employment and the stagnation steady state. So, in neither steady state the
SOE has any incentive to introduce policies loosening domestic financial distortions and supply more assets.
20The transfer problem also applies in the case of financial autarky. In this case, it can be shown that
the beggar-thy-self effects of an increase in Dt depend on the trade elasticity as long as the country is be-
low full employment (when Dt is not sufficiently loose). In particular, unless the elasticity is very low, the
gains for consumption arising from the higher domestic output more than offset the loss of purchasing power
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4.3 Implications for deregulation and liberalization
From the analysis above, we conclude that from the perspective of individual countries, re-
laxing the domestic borrowing constraints so as to raise the domestic natural rate thereby
pursue full employment is effective only if complemented by capital control measures, insur-
ing a high degree of financial autarky. For domestic stabilization purposes, deregulation and
capital controls are complements.21
But while counterproductive from a domestic vantage point under full integration, measures
that raise the supply of domestic assets are always desirable from a global perspective (see
CFG and EMSS). Unfortunately, our results suggest that individual countries have the incen-
tives to pursue asset supply policies only under financial autarky, in which case the increased
domestic asset supply does not fuel the pool of globally available assets. Hence, the right
incentives are at work in precisely the wrong conditions.
5 Reforming the monetary policy framework
A key result of the secular stagnation literature is that, with policy rates stuck at their lower
bound, real interest rates endogenously rise above the market clearing level in steady state,
depressing demand and generating persistent negative output gaps.
In a closed economy context, there is therefore an argument for either increasing the target
inflation, or for lowering the effective lower bound (ELB) constraint, i.e. set negative policy
rates, in an attempt to enhance the ability of the monetary authorities to stimulate demand.
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of either measure in a small open economy that
is financially integrated in world capital markets in turn.
5.1 A higher inflation target
In a closed economy, raising the inflation target can be helpful to the extent that the target is
set above the negative of the natural real rate. In this case, the full employment steady state
necessarily exists—and is characterized by a strictly positive nominal interest rate. However,
as discussed in Eggertsson et al. (2017), a revision of the target by itself does not rule out
the stagnation steady state. In this sense, the measure is less effective as a tool for forward
guidance than in economies where the duration of the zero lower episode is finite (Eggertsson
internationally due to the real depreciation.
21The effects of conventional fiscal policy are amply discussed in other contributions on secular stagnation
(for example EMSS and Eggertsson et al. (2017)). While we do not discuss fiscal policy explictly, we note that,
to the extent that such policies aim at increasing the domestic natural rate, their effects can be expected to
be similar as those from asset supply policies.
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and Woodford 2003). Building on our analysis in the previous section, it is easy to show that
the same result extends to our small open economy in financial autarky.
Under financial integration, however, the policy’s benefits are subtler. A higher target by
itself does not affect the existence of the two steady states: the full employment steady state
exists even for inflation targets that are sufficiently low for the stagnation steady state to
be unique if the economy was financially closed. Moreover, the mechanism by which the full
employment steady state exists does not rely on increasing the inflation target by enough to
enable the monetary authorities to match the (negative) domestic natural real rate. Indeed,
the domestic real rate exceeds the natural real rate even in the full employment steady state—
and this is so independently of (any positive) domestic inflation target given that all asset
prices are determined internationally.22
What can be altered via a change in the inflation target is the transition to full employment
discussed in Section 3.4. Recall Figure 1 where, in the escape, per effect of shifting expec-
tations, domestic policy makers hit the inflation target instantly, as the zero lower bound
ceases to bind in the period of the lift-off. Thus with a higher inflation target, the recovery is
accompanied by higher levels of inflation, with two key implications. On the supply side, from
the Phillips curve (8), output recovers more quickly by relaxing the downward constraint on
nominal wages at a faster pace.23 On the demand side, the transition is fostered by faster
depreciation towards the new steady state of the exchange rate.
5.2 A lower effective lower bound (ELB)
In a closed economy (or under financial autarky), lowering the effective lower bound (ELB)
on policy rates helps alleviate secular stagnation. This is because, as the nominal rate falls,
the real rate falls alongside the nominal rate thereby moving closer to the (negative) natural
rate rate. As the gap between the real rate and its natural counterpart is reduced, the output
gap narrows.
Under financial integration, this policy has no such effect, but is instead counterproductive.
This is so by the very logic of the Neo-Fisherian argument proposed by, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2017) and Cochrane (2017). For a given real rate, lower rates make inflation
more negative, which exacerbates the underemployment problem. Formally, when the ELB
22A negative inflation target would not work, as the Phillips curve (8) in this case would imply a negative
output gap. However, for any positive target, the size of the target itself is entirely neutral for the allocation.
Namely, a higher target would merely be reflected in a higher nominal interest rate, and in a higher rate of
trend nominal depreciation by condition (17).
23By repeating the experiment from Figure 1, but with a slightly higher inflation target, we note that output
recovers more quickly and at some point jumps to potential straight away, in the period where the wage rigidity
ceases to bind. This occurs when Π¯ > (Y f/Yt−1)(1−α)/α, recall equations (8) and (9).
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is lowered to negative territory, (10) and (11) change to
ΠH,t = Π¯ subject to it ≥ −i¯ZLB,
along with
it = −i¯ZLB if ΠH,t < Π¯,
where i¯ZLB > 0 is the degree of effective relaxation of the zero bound constraint. From the
Fisher equation (2) and its ROW counterpart, it follows that domestic inflation falls below
inflation in ROW as i = 0 falls to i = −i¯ZLB, again because domestic (long run) real rates are
determined internationally and hence not affected by domestic policy. That is, as i¯ZLB > 0
and the economy is in the stagnation steady state, the economy must experience a higher rate
of deflation than ROW, which, from Phillips curve (8), implies an even deeper recession—in
fact, deeper than the recession in the rest of the world.
Hence again, and in line with the arguments made in the previous section, a policy that has
an overall favorable effect when the economy is (financially or entirely) closed, turns out to
be beggar thy self when the economy is financially open.
In concluding this subsection we observe that, under appropriate circumstances, reducing
the ELB may be beneficial along the escape transitional dynamics. This is not the case in
Figure 1, since the nominal interest rate is strictly positive at every point in time, but it
may be useful in economies where the nominal interest rate remains at its lower bound in
the initial phase of the transition. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 3 in the Appendix
A.4—the version of the model where along the escape, trade elasticities are changing over
time, as discussed in Section 3.4. In this context, a lower ELB allows a faster recovery in the
conventional way: it shortens the length of time in which monetary policy is constrained at
the beginning of the escape.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that small open economies in a world of secular stagnation can attain full
employment by depreciating their currencies and acquiring net foreign assets. Yet, weakening
terms of trade can reduce domestic welfare even though output rises to full employment.
While the adjustment path can involve a temporary hike in domestic real rates, in the long
run, these remain anchored at the level determined in international asset markets. In nominal
terms, instead, domestic rates rise above zero also in the long run, commensurate with the
higher inflation and nominal depreciation at full employment.
Our relatively simple model illustrates that cross-border trade in goods and assets offers
important adjustment margins and opportunities to avoid stagnation. Under full financial
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market integration, nonetheless, policy prescriptions that are effective in closed economies in
temporary downturns—i.e., in temporary liquidity traps in standard New Keynesian models—
do not necessarily work in open economies in permanently depressed environments. To the
extent that arbitrage in capital markets constrains real rates, lowering the policy rate below
zero can be harmful rather than helpful, as is the case in closed economy models or models
of temporary downturns. Similarly, relaxing the domestic frictions that constrain domestic
borrowing is neutral in terms of output, yet beggar thy self in terms of consumption when
asset markets are internationally integrated.
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A Appendices
A.1 Model equations
We define the relative price Φt ≡ Pt/PH,t. We also denote the real stock of net foreign assets
NFArt ≡ NFAt/Pt. The home economy can be summarized by the following equations. The
stock equation for the net foreign asset position
NFArt = −
Dt
1 + rt
1
Φt+1
+
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
1
Φt
(Yt −Dt−1)
as well as the flow equation
NFArt = (1 + rt−1)NFA
r
t−1 +
Yt
Φt
− Ct.
The aggregate demand equation
Yt = Φ
σ
t ((1− ω)Ct + ωQσt Y ∗)
The price indexes, Fisher and UIP equations
Qt =
St
Φt
St =
EtP ∗t
PH,t
Φt = [(1− ω) + ω(St)1−σ]
1
1−σ
1 + rt = (1 + r
∗)
Qt+1
Qt
1 + it =
Et+1
Et ,
where we have used that 1 + i∗ = 1. The aggregate supply and policy rule given by
Yt =
γ Y α−1αt−1
ΠH,t
+ (1− γ)(Y f )α−1α
 αα−1
1 + it = 1
around the unemployment steady state (as long as ΠH,t < (Y
f/Yt−1)
1−α
α ), and by
Yt = Y
f
ΠH = Π¯
around the full employment steady state.
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A.2 Existence of steady states
The domestic steady state can be summarized by the following set of equations:
NFAr = − D
1 + r
1
Φ
+
1
1 + [β(1 + r)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
1
Φ
(Y −D) (A.1)
NFAr = (1 + r)NFAr +
Y
Φ
− C (A.2)
Y = Φσ ((1− ω)C + ωQσY ∗) (A.3)
Q =
S
Φ
(A.4)
∆S =
∆εΠ∗
ΠH
(A.5)
Φ = [(1− ω) + ω(S)1−σ] 11−σ (A.6)
(1 + r) = (1 + r∗)∆Q (A.7)
(1 + i) = ∆ε (A.8)
Y = { Y
f
[
(1−γ/ΠH)
(1−γ)
] α
α−1
if ΠH < Π¯ and 1 + i = 1
Y f if ΠH = Π¯ and 1 + i ≥ 1
(A.9)
Relative prices must be constant in steady state, such that ∆Q = ∆S = ∆Φ = 1. As a result,
the real interest rate in the domestic economy is the same as in ROW, from (A.7). So, from
the steady state value of the real interest rate in the ROW and from equation (A.7), we have
(1 + r) = (1 + r∗) = 1/Π∗ in steady state.
A.2.1 Existence of stagnation steady state
In this case the zero lower bound is binding such that 1 + i = 1, implying ∆ = 1 from (A.8).
Then, ΠH = Π
∗ and Y = Y ∗ from (A.5) and (A.9) respectively. We proceed by combining
equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) as
Y = Φσ[(1− ω)(r∗NFAr + Y Φ−1) + ωQσY ∗]
⇔ Y (1− Φσ−1(1− ω)) = Φσ−1(1− ω) r
∗
1 + r∗
D∗ −D
Y ∗ −D∗Y
∗ + ωΦσQσY ∗
where we have used that
D∗
1 + r∗
=
1
1 + [β(1 + r∗)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
(Y ∗ −D∗),
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see the allocation in ROW described in Section 2.7. If we further combine (A.4) and (A.6) to
Φ = ((1− ω)/(1− ωQ1−σ)1/(1−σ) we can re-write this as
Y (1 − (1 − ωQ1−σ)) = (1 − ωQ1−σ) r
∗
1 + r∗
D∗ −D
Y ∗ −D∗Y
∗ + ω(
1− ω
1− ωQ1−σ )
σ
1−σQσY ∗. (A.10)
Once we recognize that under stagnation, Y = Y ∗, we note that equation (A.10) can be seen
as determining Q for any given D. The existence of the stagnation steady state therefore
depends on the existence of a Q which solves this equation.
First note that, in the case of symmetric D = D∗, the term in the middle drops out. In
this case, equation (A.10) can be easily seen to be solved by Q = 1, implying Φ = S = 1
from equations (A.6) and (A.4), in turn implying C = Y ∗ from equation (A.3) and hence
NFAr = 0 from equation (A.2). This is the first part of Proposition 1.
In the general case D 6= D∗ we need to refer to the Intermediate Value Theorem. Subtracting
the right hand side in equation (A.10) we restate the condition for existence as f(Q) = 0.
First, it is easy to see that f(1) > 0 for D > D∗, and f(1) < 0 for D < D∗.24 Let us make
this case distinction more explicit.
Case D > D∗: When σ > 1, we see that f tends to minus infinity as Q tends to plus infinity,
as long as condition r∗/(1− r∗)(D∗ −D)/(Y ∗ −D∗) > −1 is satisfied. This condition holds
unless D is unreasonably large, given that r∗ is close to zero. Because, as we have argued
above, f(1) > 0, we conclude that there must exist a 1 < Q < ∞ such that f(Q) = 0.25
Instead, when σ < 1, we exploit that f has a pole at Q = ω1/(σ−1) > 1. Namely, as can be
seen in equation (A.10), the last term on the right hand side tends to plus infinity as Q tends
to the pole from below. This implies that f tends to minus infinity as Q tends to the pole from
below. Again, because of f(1) > 0, we conclude that there must exist a 1 < Q < ω1/(σ−1)
such that f(Q) = 0.
Case D < D∗: When σ > 1, f tends to Y ∗ > 0 as Q tends to Q = ω1/(σ−1) < 1. Because, as
we have argued above, f(1) < 0, there must exist an ω1/(σ−1) < Q < 1 such that f(Q) = 0.
Finally, when σ < 1, it turns out that σ must be high enough for an equilibrium to exist (that
is, σ can not be too close to zero). Moreover, the threshold value for σ depends on the degree
of distortion, i.e. on the exact size of D < D∗. Here we merely state a sufficient condition.
Assume that ω(1 + ω) < 1.26 In this case, f(ω) > 0 whenever (1 − ω2−σ)(1 + ω/(1 − ω2) +
r∗/(1− r∗)(D∗ −D)/(Y ∗ −D∗)) < 1.27 This condition holds for σ large enough and D∗ −D
24This follows because f(1) = 0 under D = D∗ as argued earlier above.
25f is easily seen to be continuous on this interval.
26In our calibration, ω = 0.2 such that this expression is 0.24 < 1.
27To see this, note that f(ω) = Y ∗{1−(1−ω2−σ)(1+ω(1−ω)σ/(1−σ)ωσ(1−ω2−σ)1/(σ−1)+r∗/(1−r∗)(D∗−
D)/(Y ∗ − D∗))} > Y ∗{1 − (1 − ω2−σ)(1 + ω/(1 − ω2) + r∗/(1 − r∗)(D∗ − D)/(Y ∗ − D∗))}, where the last
inequality holds as long as ω(1 + ω) < 1.
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small enough (for example, it never holds for σ close to zero). Again, because f(1) < 0, there
must exist an ω < Q < 1 such that f(Q) = 0.
Notice that, once Q is determined, the remaining endogenous variables follow. First we obtain
a Φ from Φ = ((1 − ω)/(1 − ωQ1−σ)1/(1−σ), which implies an S from (A.6), a C from (A.3)
and, finally, a NFAr from (A.2).
A.2.2 Existence of full employment steady state
Let us now prove existence of the full employment steady state. First, note that under full
employment Y = Y f at all times. Inflation must be on target from (A.9) such that ΠH = Π¯,
which from (A.5) implies that ∆ = Π¯/Π∗ > 1, such that from (A.8) 1 + i > 1. Furthermore,
notice that equation (A.10) holds also in the full employment steady state, with the difference
that Y = Y f instead of Y = Y ∗. The proof follows therefore the same steps as the existence
proof of the stagnation steady state: for given D, it is required to obtain a Q such that
equation (A.10) under Y = Y f is satisfied. Let us start with the symmetry case. When
D = D∗, f(1) > 0 because, as we have shown above f(1) = 0 under Y = Y ∗ and Y f > Y ∗.
Hence, the existence proof is the same as the case D > D∗ in the previous subsection: there
must exist a Q > 1 such that f(Q) = 0. This immediately implies that S > 1 and Φ > 1 in
this steady state, from equations (A.4) and (A.6). To show that net foreign assets must be
strictly positive, rewrite (A.1) as
NFAr ∗ Φ = − D
∗
1 + r∗
+
1
1 + [β(1 + r∗)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
(Y −D∗).
We know that that right hand side is zero under Y = Y ∗. Hence, because Y f > Y ∗, it must
be greater than zero under Y = Y f . For the left hand side to be greater than zero, it is
required that NFAr > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
The asymmetric case proceeds as above. When D > D∗, f(1) > 0 (even more positive than
under D = D∗), for the reasons spelled out in the existence proof of the stagnation steady
state. Hence, there must exist a Q > 1 such that f(Q) = 0 (this Q must therefore be greater
than under symmetry, i.e., a higher D implies an even more depreciated equilibrium real
exchange rate). Conversely, when D < D∗ it can be the case that either f(1) < 0 or f(1) > 0.
In either case, we proceed as in the existence proof of the stagnation steady state above.
A.3 Is the stagnation steady state locally determinate?
Here we demonstrate that, in our model, the stagnation steady state is locally indeterminate.
We do so, because in Eggertsson et al. (2016) the steady state where both economies are
symmetrically are their zero bound is found to be determinate. For simplicity, we proceed
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with the case of full symmetry only, where in particular Dt = D
∗. Lower case letters denote
log-deviation of upper case letters, absolute deviation in the case of NFArt .
Using that NFAr = 0, Φ = 1, Y = Y ∗ and rt = r∗ we linearize the stock equation for net
foreign assets as
nfart =
D∗
1 + r∗
(
(1 + ξ)rt + φt+1 − φt + Y
∗
Y ∗ −D∗ yt
)
,
where we define ξ ≡ 1−ρρ [β(1+r
∗)1−ρ]−1/ρ
1+[β(1+r∗)1−ρ]−1/ρ . Using that C = Y
∗, the asset flow equation can be
linearized to
nfart = (1 + r
∗)nfart−1 + Y
∗(yt − φt − ct).
The aggregate demand curve is given by
yt = σφt + (1− ω)ct + ωσqt,
the price indexes are
qt = st − φt
st = et − pH,t
φt = ωst,
the asset price equations are
rt = ∆qt+1
0 = ∆et+1 (A.11)
where we have used that it = 0, and finally, the Phillips curve is given by
yt = (γ/Π
∗)(yt−1 +
α
1− αpiH,t).
Using the price indexes and the flow equation for net foreign assets we may rewrite the demand
equation as
yt = σ
ω(2− ω)
1− ω qt + (1− ω)ct
= σ
ω(2− ω)
1− ω qt + (1− ω)(yt −
ω
1− ωqt −
1
Y ∗
(nfart − (1 + r∗)nfart−1)).
Solving for yt yields
yt =
1
1− ω (σ(2− ω)− (1− ω))qt −
1− ω
ω
1
Y ∗
(nfart − (1 + r∗)nfart−1). (A.12)
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Furthermore, we may write the Phillips curve as
yt = (γ/Π
∗)(yt−1 − α
1− α(
1
1− ω∆qt −∆et)), (A.13)
where γ/Π∗ < 1, see Section 2.7. Finally, from the first equation and the real version of the
UIP condition
nfart =
D∗
1 + r∗
((
1 + ξ +
ω
1− ω
)
∆qt+1 +
Y ∗
Y ∗ −D∗ yt
)
. (A.14)
The four equations (A.11)-(A.14) in {yt, qt, nfart ,∆et} pin down the determinacy properties
of the system. We find numerically that the system is indeterminate as long as the condition
σ(2− ω)− (1− ω) > 0 (the factor multiplying qt in equation (A.11)) is satisfied.28 We may
assume that this condition holds, as it implies a very low threshold value σ = (1−ω)/(2−ω) <
0.5 below which the dynamic properties of the system change.
In particular, this condition includes the case of full substitutability between foreign and
domestic consumption considered in Eggertsson et al. (2016), which is σ = ∞. Substituting
this in, we obtain qt = 0 from (A.12) such that the system reduces to
yt = (γ/Π
∗)(yt−1 +
α
1− α∆et)
0 = ∆et+1,
with nfart being residually determined in nfa
r
t = (D
∗/(1+r∗))(Y ∗/(Y ∗−D∗))yt. This system
is clearly seen to be indeterminate.29
A.4 Beggar-thy-self escape to full employment
One main result of the paper is that, for low enough trade elasticities, the escape from stag-
nation to full employment may be beggar thy self—reducing consumption while eliminating
underemployment. Here we compute the approximate threshold for the elasticity σ below
which the escape is beggar thy self in the case of symmetry, stated in Proposition 2. We also
show how the beggar-thy-self property changes transitional dynamics.
28Checking this analytically requires the computation of eigenvalues of a five by five matrix.
29The reason Eggertsson et al. (2016) obtain a different result is that they are deriving the determinacy
properties of the world economy in the symmetric secular stagnation. Specifically, once the domestic country
has zero mass, their proof in Proposition 4 verifies that output and inflation in the foreign economy (the ROW
in our context) are locally determinate around their stagnation steady states. This is true also in our analysis:
because the ROW is effectively a closed economy, the analysis from Eggertsson et al. (2017), which implies
local determinacy under stagnation, directly applies. In contrast, here we have shown that variables in the
small domestic economy are locally indeterminate under symmetric stagnation.
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A.4.1 Derivation of threshold
We show that, once σ falls below some (approximate) threshold, the full employment steady
state has a lower level for aggregate consumption than the stagnation steady state. We focus
on consumption, because in our model, welfare and consumption are directly related (compare
the households’ objective in Section 2).
Start with combining the equations for the asset flow (A.2), aggregate demand (A.3), and
price indexes (A.4) and (A.6) from Appendix A.1 to obtain
Yt(1− (1− ωQ1−σt )) =
(
1− ω
1− ωQ1−σt
) σ
1−σ [
(1− ω)((1 + rt−1)NFArt−1 −NFArt ) + ωQσt Y ∗
]
,
which determines Qt for given Yt and NFA
r
t . Log-linearizing this equation around the stag-
nation steady state (characterized by Q = 1 and NFAr = 0, see above) gives
qt =
(
2− ω
1− ωσ − 1
)−1
yt =: κyt. (A.15)
Up to first order, equation (A.15) determines the required real depreciation necessary as the
economy moves to the full employment steady state (i.e. the required depreciation is κ times
the increase in output). Note in particular that κ falls in σ, such that the required real
depreciation is smaller as the trade elasticity increases.
Second, log-linearizing the asset flow from Appendix Section A.1 around the stagnation steady
state yields
ct = yt − ω
1− ωqt. (A.16)
Now combine equations (A.15) and (A.16) to obtain
ct =
(
1− ω
1− ωκ
)
yt, (A.17)
such that, up to first order, moving to the full employment steady state raises consumption
if ωκ/(1− ω) < 1. Recalling the definition of κ and rearranging yields
σ >
1
2− ω , (A.18)
which is the condition stated in the main text.
A.4.2 Escape path under beggar thy self
The transition for the case of low trade elasticity is depicted in Figure 2, where we use the
same parameter values as in Section 3.4, except for the trade elasticity which now is σ = 0.5.
As explained in the main text, with a low trade elasticity, the income effects from depreciation
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are strong: note that the rate of depreciation is higher than in Figure 1. As a result, domestic
consumption falls on impact, driven by a contraction in income valued at international prices
(i.e., PH,t/Pt falls faster than Yt rises), and keeps falling towards a new, lower, steady state
level. The domestic savings fall along with the consumption of the middle-aged, again due to
the strong income effects from depreciation. Still, because the domestic borrowing contracts
faster than the saving—due to the borrowing constraint of the young becoming tighter as
a result of the depreciation—the net foreign asset position increases in the escape. Overall,
the large adverse terms of trade movements have a negative effect on consumption for all
generations, such that the escape is beggar thy self.
A.4.3 Escape under time-varying trade elasticities
In what follows, we construct a numerical example showing the implications for the escape
path of letting elasticities differ as a function of time. In Figure 3, we set the elasticity at
0.5 at the beginning of the escape path, and increase it gradually to 3 as time passes. In
turn, the other parameter values are as in Figure 1 in the main text. A number of striking
results emerge. The exchange rate needs to adjust in nominal and real terms much more at
the beginning of the transition, so does inflation. The real exchange rate actually overshoots
its long-run value upfront, and appreciates during the transition. By implication, the real
interest rate falls, implying that domestic saving temporarily rises. Most remarkably, despite
the return of inflation to its target level, the nominal interest rate remains at the zero lower
bound for some periods.
Our exercise suggests that, with time-varying elasticities along the escape route, the interest
rate in a small open economy may remain at its zero-bound on impact even when the economy
starts to recover. It may take some time before the improvement in macroeconomic conditions
and persistent inflation allows the policy rate to return to positive territory. During the zero-
bound spell, the economy actually experiences some exchange rate appreciation, after an
initial overshooting of the currency’s new equilibrium (depreciated) level.
A.5 Alternative borrowing constraint
Following up on Section 4.1, here we consider an alternative specification for the model where
the borrowing constraint is expressed in terms of domestic consumption rather than output
units. That is, we replace equation (1) by Cyt = −(1/Pt)Byt = Dt/(1 + rt). As a result, the
flow net foreign asset condition (14) changes to
NFAt
Pt
= − Dt
1 + rt
+
1
1 + [β(1 + rt)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
[
PH,t
Pt
Yt −Dt−1
]
(A.19)
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Figure 2: Transition to full employment, w/ beggar thy self escape. Parameters are as in
Figure 1, except for the trade elasticity which we set to σ = 0.5.
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Figure 3: Transition to full employment, case of changing trade elasticity. Parameters as in
Figure 1, except for the trade elasticity which gradually changes from σ = 0.5 to σ = 3.
while all other equations remain as summarized in Appendix Section A.1—that is, the rest of
the model remains unaffected by this adjustment. As can be seen from equation (A.19), the
difference with respect to the baseline model is that the borrowing constraint by the young
now does not tighten per effect of the real depreciation. This has two key implications.
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First, in the region where σ is sufficiently low for the escape to be beggar thy self, the escape
may actually be accompanied by capital inflows, rather than capital outflows. Intuitively, this
is because the savings-absorption capacity of the economy is unchanged with the depreciation,
while the savings of the middle-aged are compressed per effect of the depreciation. Second, as
a result, escape to full employment under financial autarky may actually be possible under this
alternative specification (as mentioned in Section 4.1). This is because, again from equation
(A.19), the real depreciation which raises output to full employment simultaneously reduces
the drop in the domestic real rate that is required to solve equation (A.19) under NFAt = 0.
In intuitive terms, because the real depreciation directly reduces domestic excess savings,
escape without accumulating external assets may be possible even with very small changes in
domestic real interest rates.
A.6 Asset supply policies
Following up on Section 4.2, here we show that, by relaxing the domestic borrowing constraints
while the economy finds itself in stagnation (i.e., raising D > D∗), this results in a steady
state real depreciation, a fall in net foreign assets, and a drop in aggregate consumption.30
To do so, first recall that changing D leaves the amount of domestic output Y = Y ∗ < Y f
and the real interest rate (1 + r) = (1 + r∗) unaffected.
The following three equations from the model’s steady state summarized in Appendix Section
A.2 are required for this question
NFAr = − D
1 + r∗
1
Φ
+
1
1 + [β(1 + r∗)1−ρ]−
1
ρ
1
Φ
(Y ∗ −D)
NFAr = (1 + r∗)NFAr +
Y ∗
Φ
− C
Y ∗ = Φσ ((1− ω)C + ωQσY ∗)
as well as Φ = ( 1−ω1−ωQ1−σ )
1/(1−σ). This is a three-by-three system in the variables (C,NFAr,Φ)
for given exogenous D.
We conduct a comparative statics exercise. We change D to a higher level, and study whether
the implied (C,NFAr,Φ) in the new steady state rise or decline. To do so, we consider a
log-linearization (linearization for NFAr) of the previous conditions around Q = Φ = 1,
NFA = 0 and C = Y ∗, which are the conditions in the initial (perfectly symmetric with
ROW) stagnation steady state. Using small-case letters with a tilde to denote deviations
30These results can, in principle, also be inferred from the existence proof of the stagnation steady state
under asymmetry, presented in Section A.2. Here we provide an alternative proof to underline our argument.
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from the initial steady state we obtain
˜nfar = −1/(1 + r∗) Y ∗/(Y ∗ −D) d˜
˜nfar = (1 + r∗) ˜nfar − Y ∗(φ˜+ c˜)
0 = (1− ω)c˜+ (2− ω)σφ˜
where in the last equation we have used that q˜ = (1 − ω)/ω φ˜. The first equation reveals
that ˜nfar < 0 as d˜ > 0. That is, relaxing the domestic borrowing constraint unambiguously
induces capital inflows. In turn, the second and third equation determine how those capital
inflows impact on the real exchange rate and consumption.
Solving for the change in consumption c˜ by using the third equation yields
c˜ = −σ2− ω
1− ω φ˜, (A.20)
such that consumption drops as the real exchange rate depreciates. Solving for the net foreign
asset position from the second equation then gives
r∗ ˜nfar = −Y ∗(σ2− ω
1− ω − 1) φ˜, (A.21)
such that, as long as σ > (1 − ω)/(2 − ω), the net foreign asset position falls as the real
exchange rate depreciates. Notice that this is the condition we had encountered in the proof
of local determinacy of the stagnation steady state in Section A.3: there we had assumed this
condition to hold, as it implies a very low threshold elasticity.
Because ˜nfar < 0 falls as d˜ > 0 rises, we have established that the real exchange rate
depreciates (φ˜ > 0 and hence q˜ > 0) from equation (A.21), and that consumption drops
(c˜ < 0) from equation (A.20), following a relaxation in the domestic borrowing limit.
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